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Abstract
We assess the impact of merger policy on entry and entrepreneur-
ship. When faced with uncertainty about its prospects, and foreseeing
that it may wish to leave the market should profitability prove poor,
a rational entrant considers possible exit routes. Horizontal merger
reduces competition post-merger which, all else being equal, lowers
welfare; but merger also provides a valuable exit route. By facilitat-
ing exit and thus raising the value of entry, more lenient merger policy
may stimulate entry sufficiently that welfare is increased overall. We
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calculate the optimal merger policy in the form of a low, but posi-
tive, profitability threshold below which merger is permitted despite
the adverse impact on post-merger competition. This may be viewed
as an extension of the “failing firm defence” to include ailing, low
profitability firms as well as imminently failing ones. Merger policy
is compared with an entry subsidy, and the implications of strategic
firm behaviour for the choice of merger policy are also examined.
Keywords: Merger policy, entry, exit, entrepreneurship.
JEL classification: K21, L40, M13, G34.
1 Introduction
Competition effects are central to merger policy in most major jurisdictions.
In the U.S. and the U.K., a merger that results in a “substantial lessening of
competition” (SLC) is liable to be prohibited. The merger test in the Euro-
pean Union—whether the transaction constitutes a “significant impediment
to effective competition” (SIEC)—has a similar interpretation. Competition
effects are typically assessed in a narrow and relatively static manner, taking
account of the immediate and likely future impact in the market(s) in which
the merging parties operate. The wider dynamic effects of merger policy on
competition are typically ignored.
This paper argues that merger policy can have an impact on ex ante
decisions, such as market entry or expansion, which affect competition in the
long run. Ex post, horizontal merger creates a more concentrated market
structure, reducing consumer surplus and incurring deadweight loss. But
the possibility of future merger raises the expected value of entry. This
increases firms’ willingness to enter or expand, which has a beneficial effect
on competition. Taking this dynamic effect into account, the optimal merger
policy balances the welfare loss from concentration ex post with the welfare
gain from entry ex ante.
On this dynamic view, optimal merger policy would clear some mergers
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that currently would be found to cause an SLC (or SIEC) and hence be
prohibited. In our model the treatment of such cases is more lenient than
existing practice, with merger being permitted at a time when profits are
low but nonetheless positive. This could be interpreted as an extension of
the “failing firm defence” (FFD)—which permits an anti-competitive merger
when one party is about to exit the market—to include ailing,1 as well as
imminently failing, firms.2 But whereas the FFD is interpreted strictly, re-
quiring the target to be on the verge of bankruptcy, the optimal policy in
our model takes the form of a low, but positive, profitability threshold below
which a merger is to be permitted, despite its negative impact on post-merger
competition.
We identify four effects at play when setting merger policy. With the entry
encouragement effect, more lenient merger policy stimulates entry, increasing
competition and expected social surplus in the short-run, and in the long-
1In the analysis that we present, ’ailing’ is not well-defined. We mean by the term a
firm that has positive, but low profitability.
2The failing firm defence (FFD) is recognised in many jurisdictions, but the conditions
governing its application are strict and it has been successfully used in just a handful of
cases, in which firms face the prospect of imminent bankruptcy.
In the U.S., the FFD is explicitly included in the Department of Justice (DoJ) and
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Historically, three
cases were important in its establishment and development: International Shoe’s acquisi-
tion of a financially troubled competitor in 1930; Citizen Publishing Co. in 1969, when
the Supreme Court rejected a merger with a distressed newspaper company and set out
stringent conditions under which the defence would be accepted; and General Dynamics
in 1974, in which the Supreme Court concluded that the acquisition of a declining coal
mining company was acceptable even though it produced a company with a large market
share in a concentrated industry.
In the European Union, the formal basis for the FFD is less explicit; yet the Commis-
sion’s case law has developed the concept of a rescue merger. The merger of Kali und Salz
and Mitteldeutsche Kali in 1993 established the principle of the failing firm defence (Case
No. IV/M.308, 1994). The principle was reinforced in 2001 when BASF was permitted
to acquire its chemical industry competitors Eurodiol and Pantochim, which were both in
receivership.
In the U.K., the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) published a restatement of its approach to
failing firms in merger reviews in December 2008. In 2009 the OFT cleared the acquisition
of 15 Zavvi stores by rival HMV under failing firm analysis.
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run when merger does not occur. The competition effect reflects the loss
of competition when merger takes place, reducing social surplus in the long-
run. The synergies effect captures the possibility that this loss of competition
may be mitigated by merger-specific benefits (e.g. technological synergies),
raising welfare compared with the pre-entry situation. Finally, greater entry
entails higher expected sunk costs, reducing social welfare; this is the sunk
cost effect. In order for it to be optimal to use merger policy to encourage
entry, the entry encouragement effect must outweigh the loss of competition,
net of synergies, and sunk cost effects. We provide sufficient conditions for
this to be the case, first when firms cannot manipulate profits to hit the policy
threshold; and later, when an asymmetry of information between firms and
the policy-maker allows “gaming” of the rule. We show that the possibility of
strategic behaviour does not negate the role of merger policy in encouraging
entry; indeed, in some circumstances it strengthens the case.
Three general conditions are necessary for our policy recommendation to
hold. First, entry must be socially desirable, in that the short-run benefits
from competition outweigh the social cost of additional fixed costs. Secondly,
merger must increase the profits of the merging firms (in particular that
of the entrant), so that the possibility of future merger attracts additional
entry. Thirdly, there must be (at least) a short-run increase in competition
due to entry. If any of these conditions fail, then merger policy should not
be used in the way that we describe. The “worst case” for our story is
a relatively unconcentrated Cournot oligopoly with homogeneous goods and
no merger synergies; in this sort of industry, merger policy may be ineffective
in encouraging entry, and excess entry could be a concern. Conversely, the
most favourable conditions for our story involve differentiated goods Bertrand
competition: here, merger policy to encourage entry can be both desirable
and effective. Moreover our focus on merger to monopoly, the situation in
which the failing firm defence is typically employed, further supports this
hypothesis.
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As well as suggesting a more lenient approach to merger control than
the current FFD, our analysis questions current policy in more subtle ways.
Assuming that the entrant is the acquired party, allowing the target to gain a
larger share from merger encourages entry. Similarly, a target with a stronger
bargaining position, perhaps due to the strength of a parent company, should
be treated more, not less, leniently. Finally, more lenient merger policy incurs
greater sunk entry costs; disregarding this, a consumerist policy-maker sets a
more lenient merger policy to encourage early entry, whereas a policy-maker
who considers industry profits sets policy more strictly.
Although our main focus is on the interaction between merger policy and
the entry decision, note that similar considerations apply to any ex ante de-
cision made by a firm. For example, the decision to build additional capacity,
extend an existing product line, initiate a research and development project
or undertake an advertising campaign could be analysed in a similar fashion.
Like market entry, such decisions also enhance competition or generate sur-
plus in other ways, benefiting consumers. What matters for dynamic analysis
is that the decision involves a sunk cost or is costly to reverse, and that the
returns are uncertain and are affected by the prospects of future merger.
We have chosen entry as an important example of such a decision, but the
analysis can be applied to other business activities.
At an abstract level our argument is familiar: less ex post competition
tends to bring about more ex ante investment, and optimal policy balances
these two factors, also taking into account duplication of fixed costs. Patent
systems reflect this balance, allowing a temporary monopoly in order to stim-
ulate competition and innovation.3 Also, again at an abstract level, merger
policy in our model works like an entry subsidy. There are, however, some
key differences. First, an entry subsidy would not entail the loss of compe-
tition and social welfare in the long-run when merger occurs; but instead it
3There is a long literature on the relationship between innovation and product market
competition; see, e.g., Vives (2008).
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incurs a social cost of funding and may have other drawbacks. We consider
this further in section 3. Secondly, firms may respond strategically to merger
policy in a way that does not arise with an entry subsidy; we explore this
issue in section 4.
The idea that ex ante (entry) decisions are affected by ex post (exit) con-
ditions is familiar from the real options literature; see, in particular, Dixit
(1989). Noting that merger is an exit route, we extend this literature by in-
corporating explicitly the role of the policy-maker and optimal policy design.
To our knowledge, we are the first to do this.
The literature on (horizontal) mergers generally is very large (see e.g.,
Jacquemin and Slade (1989) and Motta (2004) for surveys). Until quite
recently the focus has been on static models, in which firms take only short-
term considerations into account and merger occurs exogenously: see Salant,
Switzer, and Reynolds (1983), Deneckere and Davidson (1985), Perry and
Porter (1985), Farrell and Shapiro (1990), Kamien and Zang (1990) and
McAfee and Williams (1992), amongst others. This literature focuses on two
main questions: first, the private incentive for merger (i.e., whether or not
it is profitable for the merging parties), and secondly, the welfare effect of
merger in terms of its immediate impact on market conditions after merger
takes place. Merger policy then balances the deadweight loss from increased
market power against cost (and price) reduction from increased efficiency.
By contrast, in this paper, we assess merger policy in view of actions taken
before a merger is permitted. We therefore have an explicitly dynamic view
of merger, arguing that the optimal merger policy should balance incentives
for entry before merger against the deadweight loss after merger.4
Other, mostly more recent, papers look at merger in the context of
dynamic oligopoly models. Pesendorfer (2005) assesses merger incentives
4A similar trade-off appears in Auriol and Laffont (1992). In that paper, the authors
consider conditions under which it is socially efficient to have a duopoly market structure.
In their model, the duplication of fixed costs in a duopoly can be justified by a number of
competitive effects.
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and welfare implications when both entry and further mergers may occur.
Gowrisankaran (1999) uses the Ericson and Pakes (1995) framework to solve
numerically for equilibrium merger, entry, exit, investment and production
decisions.5 He finds that the prospect of merger stimulates entry: with his
parameters, the entry rate rises five-fold (from 0.3 to 1.6) when mergers are
permitted. The mechanism is similar to ours: allowing merger provides an-
other option to the potential entrant if it enters, and thus increases the value
of entry. In Rasmusen (1988), an entrant incurs a sunk cost to enter an in-
dustry, knowing that the post-entry price will be below its average cost, but
does so in the rational anticipation that the incumbent will buy it out. The
same can happen in our model, but in addition we introduce the design of
merger policy: determining when the incumbent should be allowed to merge
with the entrant.
A number of papers consider the design of merger policy in a dynamic
setting. Marino and Zabojnik (2005) look at the impact of post-merger
entry on merger policy. Nocke and Whinston (2010) analyse merger policy
when merger proposals are endogenous and subsequent mergers may also
occur. These papers, however, consider only actions that may be taken post-
merger. A few papers assess merger policy (and other antitrust measures) in
the light of ex ante behaviour. Segal and Whinston (2007) study the effects of
various antitrust policies (but not merger) on innovation using a reduced form
approach, whereby the policy alters the profit flows of a competing incumbent
and entrant, and also those of an uncontested incumbent. Since successful
entrants then become incumbents, both changes influence the incentive to
innovate. Norback and Persson (2012) model an innovator’s choice between
market entry and acquisition by an incumbent, assessing how this decision is
affected by product market competition and by merger policy. They find that
somewhat stricter merger policy increases the incentive to innovate for sale,
by ensuring bidding competition for the innovation. Other papers consider
5See also Doraszelski and Pakes (2007).
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predation in a context where merger may occur; see e.g., Saloner (1987)
and Persson (2004). Saloner (1987) shows that the incentive for predation
increases if the prey can then be acquired, a problem that might be worsened
by the failing firm defence. Persson (2004) considers this question in an
oligopoly setting, finding that the incentive for predation is then limited by
bidding competition for the prey; he also assesses the failing firm defence
in this context. Ottaviani and Wickelgren (2009) consider the impact of
merger policy on the merger decision itself; however, their paper considers
the optimal timing of intervention—essentially, whether or not to wait for
further information—rather than the design of the merger rule.
One interpretation of our proposed policy is a version of the “failing
firm defence” (FFD). A few papers analyse conditions under which failing
firm mergers might be permitted. In addition to the papers noted above,
in which the FFD is assessed in a model of predation and merger, Persson
(2005) analyses the welfare consequences of the FFD, concentrating on the ex
post efficiency of sales of the failing firm’s assets. He shows that the detailed
provisions of the FFD do not ensure that the socially-preferred buyer obtains
the assets. The focus of this work is thus quite different from ours.
Turning now to the empirical literature: there is little direct empirical
evidence concerning the relationship between merger control and entry. How-
ever, there is anecdotal evidence that prospective exit routes, including ac-
quisition by a buyer within the same industry, are an important consideration
for some investors and for the entrepreneurs they support. Venture capital-
ists (VCs) typically seek to cash in a project within three to five years; since
most of these investments initially do not earn positive cash flows, exit is
the primary way for a VC to realise a positive return. The identification of
exit possibilities is an important part of the due diligence process that VCs
conduct before they decide to enter. Schwienbacher (2010) surveys the liter-
ature on VC exits and provides empirical analysis of VC exits in Europe and
the U.S. Data on exit routes in Europe show that divestment by trade sale
8
or “acquisition exit” to an existing firm, often one that operates in the same
industrial sector as the target firm, was a more common exit route than ini-
tial public offering (IPO) throughout the period 1998-2005.6 Schwienbacher
(2010) also reports that for the U.S., the ratio of trade sales to IPOs is 1.3-1.6
on average (measured in number of exits). These data support the hypoth-
esis that acquisition by an industry player is a potentially significant exit
route, which may be taken into account by entrepreneurs and their financial
backers.
Bankruptcy is also an exit route, specifically for firms experiencing fi-
nancial distress. There is an established theoretical literature on the effect
of bankruptcy procedures on ex ante decisions by firms and shareholders.7
This theoretical literature is supported by growing empirical evidence of the
importance of the relationship between bankruptcy procedures and ex ante
decisions. Fan and White (2003) examine whether individuals are more likely
to become entrepreneurs if they live in states in the U.S. with higher per-
sonal bankruptcy exemptions.8 They find that households are more likely
to own and start businesses if they live in states with higher bankruptcy
exemption levels.9 Armour and Cumming (2008) examine the relationship
6According to the European Venture Capital Association (EVCA) 2004 annual survey
of pan-European private equity and venture capital activity, trade sales represented almost
24% of all divestments in that year, while public offerings (IPOs and sales of quoted equity)
made up less than 12% of the total (other exit routes include sale to another VC or a
financial institution, management buyout, and liquidation).
7Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Green (1984) argue that bankruptcy procedures can
induce inefficient management decisions concerning investment, distribution of dividends
and financing. Mooradian (1994) analyses the effect of bankruptcy protection on the ex
ante investment policy of managers. Bebchuk (2002) shows how deviations from abso-
lute priority in bankruptcy proceedings can bias managers in favour of choosing riskier
projects. Many papers on bankruptcy procedures concentrate on ex post efficient division
of bankruptcy value; see e.g., Hart (1995).
8Entrepreneurs filing for personal bankruptcy under Chapter 7 must give up all of their
assets in excess of an exemption level in order to discharge their debts. Because exemption
levels are set by the states they vary widely, while other elements of bankruptcy law are
uniform across the U.S.
9Note that a higher level exemption may adversely affect the supply of funds to en-
trepreneurs, because financiers become less willing to lend. Nonetheless, the empirical
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between bankruptcy and entrepreneurship for 15 countries in Europe and
North America. They find the severity of personal bankruptcy laws (as mea-
sured by the time to discharge of pre-bankruptcy debts) to be a more sta-
tistically and economically significant determinant of self employment rates
than GDP growth, stock market performance, and a number of other legal
and economic factors.
These empirical findings accord with the informal, widely-held view that
the U.S. approach to bankruptcy, being less punitive than most European
countries’ regimes, is a factor in accounting for the higher rate of entrepreneurial
activity in the U.S. As part of its programme for enterprise and entrepreneur-
ship, the European Commission highlights national bankruptcy laws as a fac-
tor which may facilitate entrepreneurial activity. The U.K. has reformed its
bankruptcy regime to take account of the impact on entrepreneurial incen-
tives: the Enterprise Act 2002 reduces the time to discharge to a maximum
of twelve months in most cases. The reforms were undertaken with the stated
aim of encouraging entrepreneurship: with bankruptcy now being less oner-
ous, the hope is that more entrepreneurs will take the step of starting a
business.10 However, reform of U.K. merger control—as part of the same
Act—embodies no similar principle.
In summary: the extensive theoretical analysis and empirical evidence
of the relationship between bankruptcy and ex ante decisions lends weight
to the likely relevance of our argument that merger policy affects entry and
entrepreneurship.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we present a
two-period, reduced-form model illustrating the trade-off between encourag-
evidence suggests that the demand effect dominates.
10The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) White Paper, “Insolvency—A Second
Chance” (2001), states, “[W]e have to recognise that in a dynamic market economy some
risk taking will inevitably end in failure. Fear of failure can act as a powerful disin-
centive to potential entrepreneurs.... [T]he Government intends to legislate for a major
package of reforms to personal bankruptcy, to modernise the framework and to encourage
entrepreneurship and responsible risk taking.”
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ing entry and lower post-merger competition. Section 2.1 provides an explicit
determination of equilibrium entry and merger decisions, and determines an-
alytically the conditions under which it is socially optimal to relax merger
policy to stimulate entry. Section 3 examines whether an alternative instru-
ment might not be better for encouraging entry, formalising the comparison
with an entry subsidy. In section 4 we consider the possibility of strategic
behaviour by the firms to manipulate profit and satisfy the merger rule, and
assess its impact on the policy-maker’s choice. Section 5 concludes, with
a discussion of market conditions affecting the feasibility and desirability
of promoting entry, and the role and nature of uncertainty. An appendix
contains longer proofs.
2 A Reduced-form Model
There are three players: an incumbent, an entrant, and the policy-maker.
The incumbent operates in a market for two periods. At the start of period
1, the entrant chooses whether to enter or not. Following entry, the entrant
competes with the incumbent in period 1 and, unless merger takes place,
in period 2. The policy-maker sets policy at the outset (i.e., before the
entrant chooses whether to enter and before any information is revealed) and
cannot change this policy once it is set. (We therefore abstract away from
commitment issues on the part of the policy-maker.) The policy that we
consider concerns merger: the entrant may be permitted to merge with the
incumbent in period 2, after information about profitability is received, if
this profitability is sufficiently low.
We study a two-to-one merger for the following reasons. First, it allows
us to focus on our central question, the impact of merger on entry behaviour,
without needing to address issues considered elsewhere in the merger litera-
ture, such as who merges with whom or the impact of a merger on outside
firms. Secondly, the failing firm defence (FFD), to which our policy rec-
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ommendations relate, is typically employed in cases of merger to monopoly,
where the merger would otherwise be regarded as highly anti-competitive.11
If it chooses to enter, the entrant incurs a sunk entry cost, k. This is
distributed on [0, K] according to the continuous and twice-differentiable
distribution function F (·), with strictly positive density f(·); we denote the
Mills’ ratio F (·)/f(·) by φ(·). We shall assume that φ′(·) ≥ 0; this condition is
satisfied by a large number of distributions used in applications, e.g. uniform,
exponential; although not e.g., the Pareto distribution. The entry cost is
known to the entrant before it takes its entry decision, but is unobserved
by the policy-maker at any stage. The entrant’s per-period operating profit
pi is a random variable (perhaps due to uncertainty over its operating costs
or productive capacity) realised in the first period, after the entry decision
is taken and the entry cost incurred. Moreover, the per-period profit is
observed by the policy-maker only at the end of period 1. The common prior
is that the per-period profit pi is distributed on the interval [0, 1], according
to the continuous and twice-differentiable distribution function G(·), with
strictly positive density g(·).12 The expectation of the profit is denoted p¯i ≡∫ 1
0
pidG(pi).
Per-period monopoly profit in the absence of entry, and the corresponding
consumer surplus, are taken as the benchmark levels relative to which other
outcomes are measured (i.e. no-entry monopoly outcomes are normalised
to zero). If entry occurs, the incumbent’s per-period profit relative to this
benchmark is − (pi + Π1) < 0 while the corresponding consumer surplus is
CD > 0. For any realisation of pi it is assumed that the impact on joint profit
11One of the criteria for merger clearance under the FFD—that there exists no other
realistic purchaser whose acquisition of the target would produce a better outcome for
competition (regardless of the purchase price)—makes it more likely that an FFD case
involves a single potential bidder and that merger is to monopoly.
12The restriction that the profit is non-negative is made for convenience: otherwise, the
situation might arise in which the entrant’s operating profit is strictly negative and exit
is desirable. This consideration can be incorporated into the model, at the cost of greater
complexity. The fundamental insights of the model are unaffected by the restriction.
12
−Π1 < 0 (in accordance with the standard “efficiency effect”; see Tirole
(1988)), but that CD − Π1 > 0. If merger then occurs, the merged entity’s
profit in period 2 is Π2 ≥ 0 and the corresponding consumer surplus is C2 ∈
[0, CD), again measured relative to the no-entry monopoly benchmark. These
values allow for the possibility of merger synergies, arising from physical or
intellectual capital created by the entrant, which may render the post-merger
situation superior to the pre-entry status quo; nonetheless, merger reduces
consumer surplus compared with duopoly. The firms’ incremental profit from
merger, Π1 + Π2, is denoted ∆Π: given the assumptions above this is always
positive,13 and its magnitude is at least equal to that of the profit loss from
entry in period 1 (i.e. ∆Π ≥ Π1). We assume that bargaining is efficient such
that, if merger is permitted, it takes place. The entrant’s payoff from merger
(over and above its operating profit pi) is its share of the merger surplus,
b∆Π, where b ∈ [0, 1] reflects the entrant’s bargaining strength.
This reduced-form approach, adopted largely for its tractability, can en-
compass a number of standard merger models. It assumes that the entrant’s
profit gain and the incumbent’s profit loss upon entry are positively related.
For example, in the framework of McAfee and Williams (1992)—a Cournot
model in which a firm’s marginal cost depends negatively upon its capital
stock—greater entrant capital stock raises the entrant’s profit while reducing
that of the incumbent. However, the impact of entrant capital stock on joint
duopoly profits is not clear-cut; given this ambiguity, we do not assume any
particular relationship between pi and Π1. Merger synergies arise in McAfee
and Williams (1992), as merger combines the capital stocks of the merging
parties, but other merger models do not necessarily generate such effects.
Accordingly, our reduced form model allows for the post-merger situation to
differ from that prevailing pre-entry, specifically the possibility of synergies
that benefit the merged firm and/or consumers, but does not require this
13Since this is merger to monopoly the issues raised by Salant, Switzer and Reynolds
(1983) and others concerning the profitability of horizontal merger do not arise.
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or place a particular form on these benefits. (The implication of possible
linkages between the various outcomes is discussed in section 5.) One major
restriction imposed by the reduced-form approach, however, is that Π1,Π2
and ∆Π are assumed to be constants, and hence independent of the real-
isation of pi.14 The loss of generality this entails is the cost of the added
tractability of the approach.
The policy-maker’s social welfare function (SWF) is W = C +λΠ, where
C denotes consumer surplus and λ ∈ [0, 1] is the weight on firms’ (combined)
profits Π. In the special case of a fully consumerist policy-maker, no weight is
placed on profits: λ = 0. Firms and the policy-maker use the common period
2 discount factor δ > 0; as well as the rate of time preference, this reflects the
time that elapses between entry and possible merger, and the duration of the
post-merger interval.15 Given that CD − Π1 > 0, entry is welfare-increasing
for any λ (this assumption is discussed in section 5). We also assume that the
short-run welfare effect of merger is negative, i.e. C2 −CD + λ∆Π < 0; were
this not the case, lenient merger policy would be optimal anyway, regardless
of any impact on entry.
The policy-maker sets policy at the outset, before it knows the realisation
of the entrant’s profitability pi. In addition, the policy-maker does not observe
the entry cost k, either when setting the policy or when implementing it in
period 2. The chosen policy is to allow merger in the second period iff
the realisation of pi is sufficiently low—below piM , say. (Note that the policy
cannot be conditioned on the entry cost, as this is not observed by the policy-
maker.) A higher choice of piM entails more lenient merger policy.
In summary, then, the timing of the game is as follows:
t = 0: the policy-maker sets piM ; k is realised; the entrant decides whether to
14We are grateful to a referee for pointing out the importance of highlighting this feature.
15δ can be thought of as the ratio of the length of the post-merger period to that of the
post-entry, pre-merger period, adjusted for time discounting. Thus it is possible to have
δ > 1 (and nothing in the analysis requires δ < 1). We thank an anonymous referee for
pointing this out.
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enter or not;
t = 1: pi is realised; if entry occurred at t = 0 then the firms compete;
t = 2: if entry occurred at t = 0, then merger occurs if permitted; otherwise
they compete.
The key question is: what is the (socially) optimal level of piM? If merger
is never socially desirable ex ante, then the optimal level is piM = 0; con-
versely, if merger is socially desirable at all levels of pi, then the optimal
piM = 1.
2.1 Optimal merger policy
If merger is not permitted at any profitability level (i.e., piM = 0), then the
entrant’s expected value from entry is V = (1 + δ)p¯i − k. Entry occurs iff
k ≤ k0 ≡ (1 + δ)p¯i. (Note that since the entry cost is entirely sunk and
the flow profit is always non-negative, the entrant will continue to operate
even when merger is not permitted.) Expected social welfare, relative to the
no-entry benchmark, in this no-merger case is given by
W (0) = F (k0)(1 + δ) (CD − λΠ1)− λ
∫ k0
0
kdF (k).
Similarly, if merger is permitted at any profitability level (piM = 1), then the
entrant’s expected value from entry is V = (1 + δ)p¯i + δb∆Π − k and entry
occurs iff k ≤ k1 ≡ (1 + δ)p¯i + δb∆Π. Expected social welfare in this case is
W (1) = F (k1)
(
CD − λΠ1 + δ (C2 + λΠ2)
)− λ∫ k1
0
kdF (k).
The relative magnitudes of W (0) and W (1) are ambiguous: allowing merger
reduces period 2 welfare compared with duopoly, but on the other hand
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entry occurs more often, raising welfare relative to the no-entry benchmark
in period 1 and possibly also period 2 (if C2 + λΠ2 > 0).
We shall assume that the parameter values are such that W ′(1) < 0, i.e.,
the policy-maker does not wish to allow all mergers. Intuitively, this will
be the case when the benefits from increased entry and merger synergies are
outweighed by the loss in competition and increase in sunk costs when the
prospect of merger encourages entry.
If merger is permitted in period 2 for pi ≤ piM , then it occurs; and so the
expected value of entry is
VM = (1 + δ)p¯i + δb∆ΠG (piM)− k.
Entry occurs iff
k ≤ (1 + δ)p¯i + δb∆ΠG (piM) ≡ kM (piM) . (1)
Note that kM is an increasing function of piM : more lenient merger policy
encourages entry. Social welfare, relative to the no-entry benchmark, is given
by
W (piM) = F (kM(piM))
(
(1 + δ) (CD − λΠ1)− δG (piM) (CD − C2 − λ∆Π)
)
−λ
∫ kM (piM )
0
kdF (k). (2)
Note that the social welfare function W (piM) is differentiable in piM ; but at
this stage we do not know whether it is quasi-concave. Looking at its first-
order derivative identifies four effects that are involved in setting merger
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policy:
∂W (piM)
∂piM
= f (kM (piM)) k
′
M (piM)
(
(1 + δ) (CD − λΠ1)−δG (piM) (CD − C2 − λ∆Π)
)
− F (kM (piM)) δg (piM) (CD − λΠ1)
+ F (kM (piM)) δg (piM) (C2 + λΠ2)
− λk′M (piM) kM (piM) f (kM (piM)) .
• The entry encouragement effect : more lenient merger policy stimulates
entry, increasing expected social surplus relative to the no-entry bench-
mark in the first period, and also in the second period when merger
does not occur (i.e., when pi > piM) or if there are positive synergies
from merger. This is the expression in the first line.
• The competition effect : when merger takes place there is a loss of com-
petition compared with the immediately preceding situation, reducing
social surplus in the second period compared with the first. This is the
term in the second line.
• The synergies effect : if there are merger synergies, these partially mit-
igate the loss of competition. This is the term in the third line.
• The sunk cost effect : greater entry entails higher expected sunk costs,
reducing social welfare (except in the case of a consumerist policy-
maker). This is the final term.
Our first result gives a sufficient condition for a lenient merger policy—
meaning any merger threshold above pi = 0—to be socially optimal.
Proposition 1 Lenient merger policy (piM > 0) is optimal if
CD − λ (Π1 + p¯i)−
φ
(
(1 + δ)p¯i
)
(1 + δ)
(CD − C2 − λ∆Π)
b∆Π
> 0.
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Proof. The social welfare function W (piM) is differentiable in piM . If the
derivative of the social welfare function is positive at piM = 0, then the
optimal piM is greater than zero. Substituting k
′
M (piM) = δb∆Πg (piM) and
evaluating, one obtains
∂W (piM)
∂piM
∣∣∣∣
piM=0
= δg(0)f((1 + δ)p¯i)×(
(1+ δ)b∆Π (CD − λΠ1)−φ((1+ δ)p¯i) (CD − C2 − λ∆Π)−λb∆Π(1+ δ)p¯i
)
.
Since δg(0)f((1 + δ)p¯i) > 0, the proposition follows.
For lenient merger policy to be optimal in general, the benefits from
increased entry and merger synergies must outweigh the loss in competition
and increase in sunk costs. The sufficient condition in proposition 1 ensures
that this is the case at the lowest possible level of the policy variable piM .
A particular example helps to illustrate the proposition. Consider the
case where the distribution F (·) is uniform on [0, 1], so that φ(x) = x, and
suppose that λ = 0 (the policy-maker has a consumerist SWF). The sufficient
condition for lenient merger policy can then be written as
b∆Π
p¯i
>
CD − C2
CD
.
This is more likely to be satisfied when the profit gain from merger is large
relative to the entrant’s expected profit, the entrant’s share of this surplus
is high, the consumer surplus gain from duopoly is modest (CD is relatively
small) and/or the consumer benefit of merger synergies is significant (C2 is
relatively large).
When the sufficient condition is satisfied, the optimal piM > 0. Since we
have assumed that W ′(1) < 0, the optimal merger policy must be interior.
We consider this case in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If the condition in Proposition 1 holds, then the optimal
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choice of piM is given by the (unique) solution of
(1 + δ) (CD − λΠ1) =
(
δG (piM) +
φ (kM (piM))
b∆Π
)
(CD − C2 − λ∆Π)+λkM (piM)
(3)
Proof. See the appendix.
The interior solution given by equation (3) trades off the same four effects
identified above: the entry encouragement effect, b∆Π((1 + δ) (CD − λΠ1)−
δG (piM) (CD − C2 − λ∆Π)); the competition effect, φ (kM (piM)) (CD − λΠ1);
the synergies effect φ (kM (piM)) (C2 + λΠ2); and the sunk cost effect, λkM(piM)b∆Π.
Note that the entry encouragement effect is decreasing in piM , while the com-
petition, synergies and sunk cost effects are increasing in piM .
This characterisation of the solution means that we can consider some
of the comparative statics of the optimal policy. We do this in the next
proposition.
Proposition 3 Comparative statics.
(1) The optimal merger policy piM is increasing in b.
(2) In the absence of synergies, the optimal merger policy piM is increasing
in CD and decreasing in λ.
Proof. (1) G (piM), kM (piM) and φ (kM (piM)) are increasing in piM . Thus,
for an increase in b, the first order condition (3) entails that piM increases.
(2) When C2 = Π2 = 0, (3) becomes (1 + δ) (CD − λΠ1) =
(
δG (piM) +
φ(kM (piM ))
bΠ1
)
(CD − λΠ1) +λkM (piM). The positive final term (the sunk cost effect) entails
that at the optimal policy, (1 + δ) >
(
δG (piM) +
φ(kM (piM ))
bΠ1
)
. With higher
CD, the increase in (CD − λΠ1) must be offset by an increase in piM , which
raises G (piM), kM (piM) and φ (kM (piM)). Similarly, higher λ entails that piM
decreases.
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2.2 Discussion
Proposition 3 establishes that greater leniency is optimal when a greater
share of the profit gain from merger accrues to the entrant. Assuming that
the entrant is the acquired party, this finding implies that allowing the target
to gain a larger share of the merger surplus encourages entry. Similarly, a
target with a stronger bargaining position, perhaps due to the strength of
a parent company, should be treated more, not less, leniently. This policy
recommendation conflicts with established practice, which has tended to dis-
allow the failing firm defence in cases where the supposedly “failing” firm is
granted a significant share of the merger surplus16 or is backed by a powerful
parent.17
The proposition also demonstrates that, in the absence of merger syner-
gies, a larger consumer benefit from competition raises the optimal merger
policy. On the face of it, this result is not entirely obvious: a larger welfare
gain from competition raises the benefit of encouraging entry but also makes
the loss of competition entailed by merger more costly. At the optimal inte-
rior choice of piM , the entry encouragement effect outweighs the competition
effect: it must do so since the difference between the two effects equals the
sunk cost effect, which is itself positive. The presence of synergies compli-
cates this analysis, however, since it is then no longer necessarily the case
that the entry encouragement effect outweighs the competition effect, the dif-
16A key obstacle to approval of the joint operating agreement (JOA) between the Detroit
News and Detroit Free Press (U.S., 1988) was the division of profits between the two
parties. The initial administrative law judge decided that the equal division proposed in
the JOA was unduly generous to the “failing” newspaper, indicating that it was not in
fact failing, and hence the FFD provision in the Newspaper Provision Act of 1970 did not
apply. This decision was subsequently overturned by the Attorney General, but only after
a delay of almost four years. See Kwoka and White (1999), Case 1, for further details.
17The U.K. Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) prohibited the proposed sale
of ICI ’s loss-making fertiliser division to Kemira Oy (U.K., 1990) in view of adverse
competition effects, despite recognising that ICI might exit the market in due course.
The strength of the parent company was something of an obstacle in this case, as the loss-
making division could be supported by the parent for some time and exit was therefore
not considered to be an immediate prospect.
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ference being given by the sunk cost effect minus the synergies effect—which,
for substantial synergies, could instead be negative. Note, however, that sub-
stantial synergies may themselves justify merger clearance, especially when
the benefits are in large part passed on to consumers.
The proposition shows that, in the absence of synergies, a consumerist
policy-maker18 implements a more lenient merger policy. The consumerist
policy-maker places less weight on the entrant’s sunk cost; with the sunk
cost effect being less important, this policy-maker prefers greater leniency.
By contrast, a policy-maker who considers industry profits sets merger policy
more strictly. This is the opposite of what might be expected in the current
practice of merger control, where a consumerist policy-maker cares more
about the loss of consumer surplus following merger and hence is more likely
to prohibit the transaction. With merger synergies, this comparative static
becomes ambiguous. Consider the effect of larger λ: with greater weight on
profits, the policy-maker takes more account of the synergistic benefit to the
merged firm Π2, and so has a reason to favour merger. But this consideration
conflicts with the sunk cost effect of greater leniency (the policy-maker who
considers industry profits pays more attention to the increase in sunk costs),
rendering the sign of the comparative static ambiguous. However, for suffi-
ciently modest synergies, the sunk cost effect dominates and lower λ favours
greater leniency.
18This seems a reasonable interpretation of policy-maker objectives given the practice of
merger control in most major jurisdictions. In merger assessments, regulators do not trade-
off higher profits against consumer detriments, and cost savings are taken into account
only if consumers benefit through lower prices.
There are also theoretical arguments as to why policy-makers might adopt a consumerist
standard. Besanko and Spulber (1993) suggest that greater weight should be attached to
consumer welfare to counter-balance the asymmetric information facing the policy-maker
about possible cost savings from merger. Neven and Ro¨ller (2005) take into account
lobbying by merging firms and the personal benefits this may bring to regulators; they
show that raising the weight on consumer surplus can be an appropriate counter-balance
to such lobbying.
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3 Alternative Policies for Encouraging Entry
In this section we consider the following question: is merger policy the right
tool for addressing the inefficiency of market power, or are there better,
alternative policies?
We have modelled merger policy as a profitability threshold below which
merger is permitted. Possible alternatives to the proposed merger policy
include a subsidy for new entrants, or a subsidy paid to firms during hard
times. From a theoretical perspective, an entry subsidy is very similar to
the merger policy that we have analysed. One major difference is the scope
for strategic manipulation of profits to hit a merger profit threshold, which
we consider in section 4 below. Another is that an entry subsidy would
not entail the loss of social welfare in the long-run when merger occurs.
A third difference is that any subsidy paid by the policy-maker requires
public funds to be raised through taxation, creating distortions elsewhere in
the economy. Although perhaps less obvious than the distortion created by
market power following a merger, this also entails a cost which should be
taken into account in policy design. Even if it were the case that an entry
subsidy creates a smaller distortion than merger policy, it might be politically
unacceptable to increase taxation for this purpose, leaving merger policy as
the preferred approach (its “cost” being more hidden, and deferred). For
example, during the 2008 financial crisis, governments in several countries
appeared to prefer merger with a rival bank to a public bail-out which would
allow the struggling institution to survive independently, despite the resulting
reduction in competition.19
There is a further reason why an entry subsidy may be an inappropriate
19On 18 September 2008, the U.K. government announced that it would waive com-
petition rules to permit the takeover of troubled Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS) by
Lloyds TSB, creating an institution with around one-third current (checking) accounts,
28% of the mortgage market and a leading position in life assurance and household insur-
ance. Governments in other countries have also facilitated bank mergers, despite possible
detriment to future competition.
22
policy: it may encourage transitory entry by firms that do not intend, or
have little prospect of, remaining active in the market. This generates lit-
tle or no benefit to consumers, while incurring the full cost of the subsidy.
By contrast, the proposed merger policy encourages only entrants that bring
effective and sustained competition: otherwise there is little or no merger
surplus and no incumbent will pay a significant amount to merge with the
entrant. (Underlying this argument is an assumption that industry partici-
pants are better placed than governments to determine which entrants pose
a significant competitive threat. We believe this to be valid.) Thus merger
policy avoids this additional source of inefficiency.
These ideas are formalised in an extension of the model of section 2 set
out below. This captures the following features noted above: the social cost
of public funds used to pay an entry subsidy, and the possibility of transitory
entry by firms that have little impact on the market yet incur the full cost of
the subsidy. Entry subsidy and lenient merger policy are compared, deriving
conditions under which merger policy dominates.
3.1 Comparison of merger policy and entry subsidy
The model of section 2 is adapted as follows. The entrant’s sunk cost is uni-
formly distributed on [0, K] and its per-period operating profit is uniformly
distributed on [0, 1]. In addition, an entrant can be either ‘effective’, with
probability 1− ρ, and will operate as previously following entry. With prob-
ability ρ, the entrant is ‘wasteful’, and has minimal impact on the market,
generating no significant increase in consumer surplus and having little effect
on incumbent profit, yet which incurs a sunk entry cost with the same distri-
bution. The wasteful entrant makes a small (but negligible) loss (pi = −ε) in
period 1 and thus exits the market at the end of period 1, at no further cost.
The entrant knows its type prior to entry but, as in section 2, the post-entry
profit of the effective type is revealed only in period 1, at which point this is
known to the entrant, incumbent and policy-maker.
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We compare two policies to promote entry: lenient merger policy, as
described in section 2, and an entry subsidy. The entry subsidy operates
as follows. Merger is not permitted, but an entry subsidy E is paid to
any entrant. This is paid upon entry, at the start of period 1, and is not
conditional upon the entrant’s subsequent performance or its duration in the
market. The social cost of funds is R ≥ 1, so that to pay a subsidy of E
actually costs RE.
The wasteful entrant formalises the possibility of transitory entry that
generates little or no benefit to consumers. This entrant does not benefit
from lenient merger policy as the incumbent will not offer to merge with it,
for two reasons: it has minimal effect on the incumbent’s profits, and since
it is unprofitable it will exit the market at the end of period 1 anyway. The
wasteful entrant does benefit from an entry subsidy, however: the subsidy is
paid up-front when the firm enters the market, at which point the policy-
maker cannot identify the entrant’s type.
In the absence of policy intervention, the wasteful entrant can only make
losses and hence such entry is deterred. The expected value of entry to a
good type is V = 1
2
(1 + δ)−k, thus entry of this type occurs for k ≤ k0 ≡ 1+δ2
(we assume that K is sufficiently large to generate interior solutions). Social
welfare, relative to the no-entry benchmark, in this no-intervention case is
given by
W (0) =
k0
K
(1 + δ) (CD − λΠ1)− 1
2
λk0.
With lenient merger policy, wasteful entry is again deterred: the incum-
bent will not offer to merge with such an entrant, being little affected by it
and knowing that it will quit in any case. If merger is permitted in period 2
for pi ≤ piM , then merger with an effective entrant occurs; thus the expected
value of entry for this type is VM =
1+δ
2
+ δb∆ΠpiM − k and entry occurs
iff k ≤ 1+δ
2
+ δb∆ΠpiM ≡ kM(piM). Social welfare, relative to the no-entry
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benchmark, under merger policy piM is given by
W (piM) =
kM (piM)
K
(
(1 + δ) (CD − λΠ1)−δpiM (CD − C2 − λ∆Π)
)−1
2
λkM (piM) .
(4)
Under the entry subsidy, the expected value of entry to an effective en-
trant is VE =
1
2
(1 + δ) − k + E, thus entry of this type occurs iff k ≤ kE ≡
1+δ
2
+E. The value of entry to a wasteful entrant is VB = E − k, thus entry
of this type occurs iff k ≤ kB ≡ E. Social welfare, relative to the no-entry
benchmark, with an entry subsidy E is given by
W (E) =
kE (E)
K
(
(1 + δ) (CD − λΠ1) + (λ−R)E
)− 1
2
λkE (E)
+ρ
(
kB (E)
K
(λ−R)E − 1
2
λkB (E)
)
. (5)
To compare the two policies we assess the welfare effect of introducing
each one, incrementally raising the entry of an effective type relative to k0.
This comparison is described in proposition 4.
Proposition 4 Lenient merger policy dominates entry subsidy when
(1 + δ)
2K
(
R− λ− CD − C2 − λ∆Π
b∆Π
)
+
1
2
λρ > 0.
This is more likely to be the case for: larger R; larger b; larger ∆Π; smaller
CD; larger C2; larger λ; and larger ρ.
Proof. See the appendix.
3.2 Discussion
The model, and proposition 4, capture the two considerations noted at the
start of this section in support of merger policy over an entry subsidy as a
means of promoting entry. The social cost of entry subsidy is captured by
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(R− λ): each unit of funds transferred to an entrant costs R ≥ 1 to raise
and yields a social benefit that is weighted by λ ≤ 1. (If public funds could
be raised without creating distortions and the policy-maker weighted profits
equally with consumer surplus, this term would be zero.) The social cost
of merger policy is given by the ratio of the welfare change from the loss
of competition, net of synergies, to the entrant’s private gain from merger,
CD−C2−λ∆Π
b∆Π
. On this basis, merger policy achieves higher welfare than an en-
try subsidy when its social cost is less than (R− λ). This is more likely when
R is large and/or the entrant’s private gain from merger is large relative to
the welfare loss from merger (i.e. for larger b, larger ∆Π, smaller CD and/or
larger C2). This relationship is affected by market conditions: for example,
with inelastic demand the merging firms capture a higher proportion of the
lost consumer surplus, reducing the social cost of merger policy. Synergy
benefits retained by the merged entity also raise ∆Π, favouring merger pol-
icy. Under the entry subsidy, by contrast, merger does not take place, thus
potential synergies are not realised.
The second consideration, that of wasteful entry, is captured by the final
term, 1
2
λρ. The greater the likelihood of an entrant that yields negligible
benefits yet incurs the full cost of the entry subsidy (i.e., higher ρ), the
stronger the preference for merger policy (which avoids this problem) over
an entry subsidy (which does not). Note that even if the first consideration
above, the social cost of each policy, favours entry subsidy over merger policy,
wasteful entry may overturn this result.
The comparative static in λ tells us that when the policy-maker puts a
greater weight on profits (higher λ) it tends to favour merger policy. This is
for two reasons: firstly, with greater weight on the profit gain from merger,
the social cost of merger is lower; second, the greater weight on the sunk
costs incurred by the wasteful entrant reduces the attractiveness of the entry
subsidy.
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4 Merger Policy with Strategic Behaviour
Policy-makers may be reluctant to use merger policy to encourage entry,
fearing that the rule may be manipulated. If the policy-maker is unable (due
to asymmetry of information) accurately to determine the level of achievable
profits, the firms may be able to use this fact and distort their profits to pass
the merger rule. In section 2 we assumed that the policy-maker can observe
the entrant’s true profitability pi perfectly, leaving no scope for strategic
behaviour to improve the firms’ position. We now relax this assumption to
consider the possibility of strategic behaviour to manipulate the merger rule
and investigate its impact on the policy.
In this section we show that merger policy can be a beneficial entry promo-
tion tool even when the firms can strategically manipulate their behaviour to
“game” the merger rule. We will consider the case where strategic behaviour
raises period 1 welfare. For example, firms may cut prices in period 1 in order
to reduce the entrant’s profits to the level where merger is then permitted.20
(We show in proposition (6) that in the opposite case, where profit-reducing
strategies do not raise welfare in the short-run—e.g. wasteful expenditures
by the entrant—that a lenient policy is never chosen.)21
Such behaviour may increase consumer surplus, and social welfare, in the
short run: for example, a price cut that reduces entrant profit to piM also
reduces the deadweight loss from market power. This possibility creates an
interesting trade-off for the policy-maker in designing merger policy. In the
first period, consumer surplus is increased by strategic behaviour; but in the
second period, consumer surplus is lowered by the merger that follows. This
is analogous to the familiar trade-off arising from predation, which generates
the short-run benefit of heightened competition but at the cost of weaker
20In the Detroit newspaper JOA, referred to in footnote 16, the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice accused the parties of engaging in a price war in the expectation that poor profitability
would result in merger clearance, making the war a “win-win” proposition.
21We are grateful to Kenneth Simons for encouraging us to consider this point.
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competition in the long run. However, in our analysis an additional factor
arises: the entry encouragement effect of strategies that raise the value of
entry. In other words, strategic behaviour can benefit consumers not only
by directly lowering prices in period 1, but also by increasing the extent of
entry.
To examine this issue, the reduced-form model of section 2 is adapted
and extended as follows. The entrant’s sunk cost is uniformly distributed
on [0, K]. In the absence of strategic behaviour, the entrant’s per-period
operating profit takes one of two values, piH and piL where piH > piL >
0, each with probability one-half. (These profit levels reflect competitive
outcomes with variation in the entrant’s marginal cost or capital stock, say.)
Joint duopoly profit relative to the pre-entry benchmark is −Π1 < 0 and
the corresponding consumer surplus is CD, where these values satisfy the
conditions set out in section 2. Similarly, post-merger profit and consumer
surplus are Π2 ≥ 0 and C2 ∈ [0, CD) respectively. As before, we define
∆Π = Π1 + Π2.
The entrant’s achievable profitability is revealed to both firms in period
1, but not to the policy-maker, who instead measures the entrant’s actual
profit.22 Accordingly, merger policy can be conditioned on the entrant’s
observed period 1 profit only, but the allocation of the merger surplus in
period 2 (when this is permitted) is based on true not observed profitability
(as this would determine period 2 payoffs in the absence of merger). The
policy-maker adopts one of the following three approaches to merger: the
strict policy forbids merger for any pi > 0 (i.e., piM = 0); the lenient policy
permits merger in period 2 following an observation in period 1 of pi ≤ piL
but prohibits it for pi > piL (i.e., piM = piL);
23 while the laissez-faire policy
22We assume that accounting manipulation to satisfy the profit target is not possible:
there must be some change in behaviour such that the entrant’s measured profit is reduced
to piL.
23Given the entrant’s profit distribution, any leniency threshold piM ∈ [piL, piH) would
permit merger under the same circumstances in the absence of strategic behaviour. But the
choice of leniency threshold might affect strategic behaviour, as it determines the amount
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allows merger in period 2 regardless of period 1 profit (piM = 1).
We do not model strategic behaviour in detail, but merely assume that
this alters period 1 outcomes as follows. Clearly, strategic behaviour is rel-
evant only when the entrant’s profitability is piH (when pi = piL the merger
rule is satisfied anyway). With strategic manipulation the entrant’s profit is
reduced to piL, perhaps by one or other firm (or both) deliberately increasing
its output in order to push down prices. Relative to the pre-entry bench-
mark, combined duopoly profits under strategic behaviour are −ΠS < 0 and
the corresponding consumer surplus is CS ≥ CD. We assume that strate-
gic behaviour raises welfare in the short-run: CS − λΠS ≥ CD − λΠ1. For
the incumbent to be worse off in the short run by acting strategically than
under non-strategic behaviour, we require (−piL − ΠS) < (−piH − Π1). For
the incumbent and the entrant (respectively) to benefit overall from strategic
behaviour, and hence to wish to participate, we require Π1 +piH −piL−ΠS +
δ (1− b) ∆Π > 0 and δb∆Π−(piH − piL) > 0; depending which firm instigates
strategic behaviour these conditions may not both be required, but the sec-
ond ensures that entry is encouraged and thus is necessary for our analysis.
Combining these three constraints, we have
min (δb∆Π,ΠS − Π1) > piH − piL > ΠS − Π1 − δ (1− b) ∆Π. (6)
4.1 Without strategic behaviour
In the absence of strategic behaviour, the entrant’s entry decision and social
welfare under each policy is as follows. Under strict merger policy, the ex-
pected value of entry is V0 =
1
2
(1 + δ) (piL + piH) − k, thus entry occurs for
of profit distortion that must be undertaken in order to game the policy. However, in a
situation where the entrant satisfied the merger rule with a profit level other than piL, the
policy-maker could infer that strategic behaviour had taken place. We therefore rule out
such possibilities.
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k ≤ k0 ≡ 12 (1 + δ) (piL + piH) and welfare is given by
W0 =
k0
K
(1 + δ) (CD − λΠ1)− 1
2
λk0. (7)
Under laissez-faire merger policy, the expected value of entry is V1 =
1
2
(1 + δ) (piL + piH)
+δb∆Π− k, thus entry occurs for k ≤ k1 ≡ 12 (1 + δ) (piL + piH) + δb∆Π and
welfare is given by
W1 =
k1
K
(
CD − λΠ1 + δ (C2 + λΠ2)
)− 1
2
λk1. (8)
Under the conditional, lenient merger policy, the expected value of entry is
VM =
1
2
(1 + δ) (piL + piH) +
1
2
δb∆Π − k, thus entry occurs for k ≤ kM ≡
1
2
(1 + δ) (piL + piH) +
1
2
δb∆Π and welfare is given by
WM =
kM
K
((
1 +
1
2
δ
)
(CD − λΠ1) + 1
2
δ (C2 + λΠ2)
)
− 1
2
λkM . (9)
The following proposition states the conditions under which the policy-maker
chooses lenient merger policy in the absence of strategic behaviour.
Proposition 5 In the absence of strategic behaviour, the policy-maker prefers
lenient merger policy to both strict and laissez-faire policy iff
λK ∈ (X,X + 2δ (CD − C2 − λ∆Π) ),
where X = 2 (1 + δ) (CD − λΠ1)−
(
(1 + δ) piL+piH
b∆Π
+ 3δ
)
(CD − C2 − λ∆Π).
Proof. The upper bound follows from the condition WM > W0 and lower
bound follows from WM > W1, using (7), (8) and (9). Note that since
CD − C2 − λ∆Π > 0, the interval is non-empty.
In the special case of a consumerist policy-maker (λ = 0) and no merger
synergies (C2 = Π2 = 0), the condition for leniency to be the chosen policy
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becomes
piL + piH
bΠ1
∈
(
2− δ
1 + δ
,
2 + δ
1 + δ
)
. (10)
Comparing W0 and W1, this case can be characterised fully: W0 > (<)W1
for piL+piH
bΠ1
> (<) 2
1+δ
. Thus, the policy-maker’s preferred approach to merger
can be described as follows:
piM = 1 for
piL+piH
bΠ1
< 2−δ
1+δ
piM = piL for
piL+piH
bΠ1
∈ (2−δ
1+δ
, 2+δ
1+δ
)
piM = 0 for
piL+piH
bΠ1
> 2+δ
1+δ
.
Intuitively, higher bΠ1 strengthens the entry encouragement effect, in-
creasing the desirability of more lenient merger policy. Higher δ reduces
both the upper and lower bounds for lenient policy, but also widens the in-
terval over which it is chosen; with greater weight on, or duration of, the
post-merger period compared with the post-entry, pre-merger interval, the
balance is shifted towards stricter policy (the range over which piM = 1
shrinks while that over which piM = 0 increases).
4.2 With strategic manipulation of lenient merger pol-
icy
With strategic behaviour, W0 and W1 are as given above, but under lenient
merger policy the expected value of entry is now VS =
1
2
((2 + δ) piL + δpiH)+
δb∆Π− k; thus entry occurs for k ≤ kS ≡ 12 ((2 + δ) piL + δpiH) + δb∆Π and
welfare is given by
WS =
kS
K
(
1
2
(CD − λΠ1) + 1
2
(CS − λΠS) + δ (C2 + λΠ2)
)
− 1
2
λkS. (11)
Comparing (11) with (9), the possibility of strategic behaviour affects welfare,
and hence the policy-maker’s choice, in a number of ways:
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• The direct effect : strategic behaviour to achieve merger increases period
1 welfare (for CS − λΠS > CD − λΠ1).
• The competition effect : merger now takes place for pi = piH as well as
piL, reducing competition and welfare in period 2.
• The entry encouragement effect : the possibility of strategic behaviour
stimulates entry (as kS > kM), tending to increase competition.
• The sunk cost effect : with more entry, greater sunk costs are incurred.
Effects similar to the first two exist in the analogous situation of preda-
tion, but the third and fourth are new.
An equivalent result to proposition 5 can be derived from (7), (8) and
(11), demonstrating that leniency may be socially preferred to either strict
or laissez-faire merger policy despite the presence of strategic behaviour.
Proposition 6 With the possibility of strategic behaviour, the policy-maker
prefers lenient merger policy to both strict and laissez-faire policy iff
λK ∈ (Y, Y +D) ,
where Y = 2 (CD − λΠ1)+2δ (C2 + λΠ2)−2piL+δ(piL+piH)+2δb∆ΠpiH−piL (CS − CD − λ (ΠS − Π1))
and D = 2δ
2δb∆Π−(piH−piL)
(
b∆Π
piH−piL (2piL + δ (piL + piH) + 2δb∆Π) (CS − CD − λ (ΠS − Π1))
− (1 + δ) (piL + piH) (CD − C2 − λ∆Π)
)
. For such a case to exist we require
both (i) strategic behaviour to raise welfare in period 1, and (ii) the entrant’s
share of the merger surplus to be sufficiently large.
Proof. The upper bound follows from the condition WS > W0 and the lower
bound follows from WS > W1, using (7), (8) and (11). For the interval to be
non-empty we require D > 0; from parameter condition (6) we have 2δb∆Π−
(piH − piL) > 0; thus D > 0 requires both (i) CS − CD − λ (ΠS − Π1) > 0,
and (ii) b∆Π to be sufficiently large.
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In the special case of a consumerist policy-maker (λ = 0) and no synergies
(C2 = Π2 = 0), the condition for leniency to be the chosen policy becomes
CS
CD
∈
(
2piH + A
2piL + A
,
2piH + A+ 2δB
2piL + A
)
.
where A = 2δbΠ1 + δ (piL + piH) and B = (1 + δ) (piL + piH) − 2bΠ1. Since
piH > piL, the condition requires CS > CD.
For leniency to be the chosen policy, strategic behaviour must raise period
1 welfare. If instead, as we have mentioned, strategic behaviour yields no
direct benefit, then proposition (6) shows that the lenient policy is never
chosen. For a consumerist policy-maker, moreover, when strategic behaviour
yields no direct benefit the lenient merger policy is always dominated by full
laissez-faire; i.e., it is always the case that W1 > WS (though W0 may in some
cases be higher still). This is because, under both policies, entry brings a
benefit of CD in period 1 and merger takes place just as often, giving the same
loss of competition in period 2, but with strategic behaviour the entrant’s
period 1 profit is lower (piL rather than its potential profit piH), weakening
the entry encouragement effect. Meanwhile, the consumerist policy-maker
ignores the greater sunk cost effect of the laissez-faire policy. However, this
finding does not undermine our general argument that the impact of merger
policy on entry may promote more permissive merger control: in many cases
it is the laissez-faire policy, rather than stricter control, that is the preferred
option.
Comparing (11) with (9), it is possible that strategic behaviour may in-
crease the desirability of lenient merger policy: WS > WM is more likely when
the direct welfare gain from strategic behaviour and/or synergy benefits from
merger are large. In the special case of a consumerist policy-maker and no
merger synergies, it can be shown that WS > WM when
CS
CD
>
(2 + 2δ + δ2) piH + (2δ + δ
2) piL + δ
2bΠ1
δpiH + (2 + δ) piL + 2δbΠ1
. (12)
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For any set of parameter values {piH , piL, δ, bΠ1} there exists a critical ratio CSCD
above which WS > WM , widening the interval over which the lenient merger
policy is preferred. Taking a numerical example, for δ = 1, piH =
3
4
and
piL =
1
4
, from (10) the critical values of bΠ1 determining the policy-maker’s
choice of merger policy in the absence of strategic behaviour are
piM = 1 for bΠ1 > 2
piM = piL for bΠ1 ∈
(
2
3
, 2
)
piM = 0 for bΠ1 <
2
3
.
For bΠ1 =
2
3
, the critical value at which WM = W0 and the policy-maker
is indifferent between strict and lenient merger policy, (12) implies that
WS > WM for
CS
CD
> 31
17
' 1.8. With consumer surplus values that satisfy
this condition, strategic behaviour increases the attractiveness of the lenient
merger policy, making it the preferred choice. For bΠ1 = 2 (the critical value
at which WM = W1), the corresponding threshold is
CS
CD
> 13
11
' 1.2.
To conclude: the possibility of strategic behaviour does not negate the role
of lenient merger policy in encouraging entry. Indeed, in some circumstances,
it strengthens the case. For the lenient merger policy to be the policy-maker’s
preferred choice there must be some social benefit from strategic behaviour;
if this is not the case, however, it may be that more lax merger control—the
laissez-faire policy—rather than stricter control is the preferred option. Thus
even this finding does not undermine our general argument, that the impact
of merger policy on entry may promote more permissive merger control.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
We have argued that merger policy should assess competition in the dynamic
sense, by taking into account the effect of the policy rule on incentives for
entry (and ex ante investment decisions in general), not just post-merger
competition. A more lenient policy—which could be characterised as ex-
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tending the existing failing firm defence to ailing as well as imminently fail-
ing firms—may yield social benefits through its beneficial impact on entry,
resulting in more effective competition overall. This paper provides a frame-
work for determining the optimal degree of leniency, and shows that lenient
merger policy will be optimal in certain circumstances: where the benefits
from increased entry and short-run competition outweigh the costs of reduced
competition in the long-run, net of any merger synergies, and the duplication
of fixed costs. We compare merger policy with an entry subsidy, illuminating
the relative costs of the two interventions and showing that under a range of
circumstances lenient merger policy dominates a direct subsidy to entry. We
also show that the case for leniency is not negated by the possibility of strate-
gic behaviour to manipulate the merger rule, and may even be enhanced by
it.
In this concluding section we review the key assumptions in our story,
to assess the robustness of our story. Recall that the desirability of lenient
merger policy relies on the entry encouragement effect (inducing more com-
petition in the short-run, and sometimes also the long-run) outweighing the
competition effect (the reduction in the long-run competition that merger
permits), net of any merger synergies, and the sunk cost effect. We require,
therefore, three general conditions to hold. First, entry must be socially de-
sirable. Secondly, merger must increase the profits of the merging firms (in
particular that of the entrant). Thirdly, there must be (at least) a short-run
increase in competition due to entry. These conditions may not always be
satisfied, especially if the situation is generalised beyond the two-firm case.
Previous work has shown that the first condition need not always hold in
models of oligopoly. Mankiw and Whinston (1986) demonstrate that there
is a tendency for excessive entry in homogeneous good industries. However,
product differentiation mitigates this finding and may reverse it: product
variety can lead to insufficient entry in equilibrium, so that entry encourage-
ment is socially desirable. Moreover, competition authorities stress broader
35
factors such as selection and efficiency effects of competition in support of a
general presumption that entry is beneficial.
The second condition, that merger increases the profits of the merging
firms, has been much studied in the merger literature and does not always
hold. In a Cournot model where firms have the same, constant marginal cost,
Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) show that the profit of a single, merged
firm may be lower than the sum of the pre-merger profits of its constituent
firms, except when merger takes in most of the firms in the industry. How-
ever, other papers, such as Deneckere and Davidson (1985), Perry and Porter
(1985) and McAfee and Williams (1992), develop models showing that merger
between two firms can be profitable for the merging parties without requiring
a highly concentrated market to be created; Deneckere and Davidson (1985)
use differentiated products while Perry and Porter (1985) and McAfee and
Williams (1992) build in capital stock affecting firms’ cost structures. Wer-
den and Froeb (1998) provide numerical analysis which suggests that merger
may be profitable even when there can be further entry after merger.
In principle, then, lenient merger policy might not always be socially
desirable or effective in encouraging entry. Based on the above, the “worst
case” for our story involves a relatively unconcentrated Cournot oligopoly
with homogeneous goods where there are no technological synergies from
merger. In this case, greater entry could worsen welfare, and merger policy
may anyway be ineffective in encouraging entry. On the other hand, the
most favourable conditions for our story involve differentiated goods Bertrand
competition. In this case merger policy to encourage entry is likely to be
both desirable and effective. Moreover our focus on entry and merger in an
already-concentrated market—the situation where the failing firm defence is
typically employed—further supports this hypothesis.
The third condition, that there must be (at least) a short-run increase
in competition, requires that merger cannot occur immediately upon entry.
There must be a “first period” during which the entrant competes with the
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incumbent(s), and its profitability is revealed. In the model this is simply
assumed. In practice, policy could reflect this issue by requiring that merger
be permitted only after the entrant has had low profitability over some sus-
tained period. In any case, an incumbent is likely to be unwilling to pay
much to buy out an entrant that has just entered its market, being uncer-
tain how strong a competitive threat it poses: some period of competition is
required to establish this before merger will be proposed.
Our model assumes uncertainty over the entrant’s profitability pi and its
sunk entry cost k. Profit uncertainty allows merger policy to be conditioned
on the entrant’s post-entry performance, while its entry decision (and, with
variation in entry cost, the degree of entry) is based on expected profit. We
have placed little restriction on the form of uncertainty, with the results in
section 2 derived for general distribution functions. Nonetheless, the nature
of these distributions has a bearing on the optimal merger rule. If the prob-
ability of low profit levels is small but encouraging entry is socially desirable,
the optimal merger policy requires a higher profit threshold to influence en-
try behaviour. If the probability that the sunk cost k is high goes up (e.g.,
there is a first-order stochastic dominance shift in the distribution F ), then
the expected cost of stimulating entry goes up. (In the terms used in this
paper, the sunk cost effect is greater.) All else equal, this makes leniency less
attractive and lowers the optimal merger rule.
An alternative model is possible, in which the sunk cost k is fixed for
all firms, and firms learn the profit pi before deciding whether to enter.24
Here, the case for the optimal policy to involve leniency is even starker. If
the policy-maker sets the threshold profit level for merger to be less than
the level required for entry, then she can ensure that mergers take place
only with firms that would not otherwise have entered. Provided the sunk
cost k is not too large, this policy must then improve overall welfare. This
variant could be made more complicated by supposing that firms receive an
24We are grateful to a referee for suggesting this point.
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imperfect signal of profitability before they decide to enter. This would not
change the basic point that emerges from the simpler case.
An interesting aspect to uncertainty concerns the possibility of linkages
between entrant profit and other outcomes in the model, causing these to
shift with the underlying source of variability. If low entrant profitability
is associated with a smaller impact on consumer surplus, then the social
loss from permitting merger in this circumstance is low, increasing the op-
timality of lenient merger policy. However, for merger policy still to be
effective in encouraging entry in this situation, there must nonetheless be
a significant profit increase from merger and the entrant must be able to
gain a significant share of this, despite its low profitability. In other words,
if the low-profitability entrant’s impact on the incumbent firm is significant
while the benefit it confers on consumers is relatively small—e.g. a high-cost
entrant that does little to reduce prices but steals market share from the
incumbent—the case for lenient policy is enhanced.
Appendix
Proof of proposition 2
The first derivative of the welfare function W (piM) is
∂W (piM)
∂piM
= δf (kM (piM)) g (piM)×(
b∆Π
(
(1 + δ − δG (piM)) (CD − λΠ1) + δG (piM) (C2 + λΠ2)− λkM (piM)
)
− φ (kM (piM)) (CD − C2 − λ∆Π)
)
.
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The second derivative is therefore:
∂2W (piM)
∂pi2M
= δ
∂
∂piM
(f (kM (piM)) g (piM))×(
b∆Π
(
(1 + δ − δG (piM)) (CD − λΠ1) + δG (piM) (C2 + λΠ2)− λkM (piM)
)
− φ (kM (piM)) (CD − C2 − λ∆Π)
)
−δ2f (kM (piM)) (g (piM))2 b∆Π
(
(φ′ (kM (piM)) + 1) (CD − C2 − λ∆Π)+λb∆Π
)
.
The expression in large brackets spanning the second and third lines is zero
at a turning point of W (piM). The final line is negative, since φ
′ ≥ 0, hence
any turning point must be a maximum. Moreover, the same argument shows
that equation (3) has a unique solution, since
(1 + δ) (CD − λΠ1)−
(
δG (piM) +
φ (kM (piM))
b∆Π
)
(CD − C2 − λ∆Π)−λkM (piM)
is single downward-crossing in piM .
Proof of proposition 4
Using the substitutions piM =
kM−k0
δb∆Π
and E = kB = kE − k0, (4) and (5)
become respectively
W (kM) =
kM
K
(
(1 + δ) (CD − λΠ1)− (kM − k0)
b∆Π
(CD − C2 − λ∆Π)
)
− 1
2
λkM ;
W (kE) =
kE
K
(
(1 + δ) (CD − λΠ1) + (λ−R) (kE − k0)
)− 1
2
λkE
+ρ (kE − k0)
(
(kE − k0)
K
(λ−R)− 1
2
λ
)
.
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Differentiating each expression in the relevant entry threshold and evaluating
at kM = kE = k0 =
1+δ
2
, we obtain
∂W
∂kM
∣∣∣∣
kM=k0
=
1
K
(1 + δ)
(
CD − λΠ1 − CD − C2 − λ∆Π
2b∆Π
)
− 1
2
λ;
∂W
∂kE
∣∣∣∣
kE=k0
=
1
K
(1 + δ)
(
CD − λΠ1 − 1
2
(R− λ)
)
− 1
2
λ (1 + ρ) .
We assume that both derivatives are positive, such that both policies are
socially desirable. A merger rule that raises (beneficial) entry incrementally
above k0 is socially preferred to an entry subsidy having the same impact
when ∂W
∂kM
∣∣∣∣
kM=k0
> ∂W
∂kE
∣∣∣∣
kE=k0
, i.e. for
(1 + δ)
2K
(
R− λ− CD − C2 − λ∆Π
b∆Π
)
+
1
2
λρ > 0.
The comparative statics in the proposition follow directly from this expres-
sion and are stated without further proof.
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